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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
A. L. WILLIAMS & SONS, 
A Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
ATHON E. BROWN and 
LUCILLE BROWN, 
VS. 
Defendants and Respondents 
S'l'A'l'EMEN'l' OF NATURE OF CASE 
Appellant seeks by this appeal to reverse a Three 
Thousand ($3,000.00) Dollar judgment granted Respond-
ents by the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, District 
.Judge, Second Judicial District. This judgment was 
granted as the result of a building erected by appel-
lant upon a parking right of way owned by respondents. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried September 28, 1965, by the court 
sitting without a jury. After conclusion of the testi-
mony, the court granted judgment to appellant of Seven 
Hundred Fifty ($750.00) Dollars damages, and Two 
Hundred Fifty ($250.00) Dollars attorneys fees, for 
breach of a lease agreement. Respondents have not 
appealed that judgment. 'l1he court further granted 
Respondents judgment upon their counter-claim against 
appellant in the sum of Three Thousand ($3,000.00) 
Dollars, for encroachment and extinguishment of an 
easement. After off set, a net judgment of two Thous-
and ($2,000.00) Dollars was entered in favor of Re-
spondents. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to reverse the Three Thousand 
($3,000.00) Dollars judgment entered against it on the 
counter-claim, Respondents seek to affirm it. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents agree generally with Appellant's State-
ment of Facts. We will supplement and add to the 
Statement as follows: The transcript will be cited 1 
(T) and the deposition of Respondent Athon E. Brown 
as (DT). Respondents will be referred to as "Brown". 
Brown owned and operated a grocery store on two 
(2) acres of land located at the intersection of 1900 
West and 2700 South in Roy, Weber County, Utah, be-
ginning in 1947. (T-39). On May 7, 1959, Brown 
entered an agreement with Roy Shopping Center, Inc., 
appellant's predecessor in interest. (Ex. 3.) This con- 1 
tract provided that in return for his lands, Brown 
would receive, upon completion of the proposed shopping 
center, a 6400 square foot building together with a right 
of way in all the parking and service areas. (Ex. 3, Page 
3, Par. 5) 
Pursuant to this agreement, and upon completion 
of the center, Brown received by warranty deed the 
store property, together with the parking and service 
rights of way for his use, his tenants and customers. 
(Ex. C.). This deed, specifically describing the right-of- ' 
way, was recorded in the Weber County Recorder's of-
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fice July 30, 1959. (~x. C. T-17). He later purchased an 
additional area, making his store area 6472 square feet. 
(T-41). 
In October of 1959, Norman Thompson, of the Roy 
Shopping Center, Inc., presented Brown a quit claim 
deed (Ex. 4) covering an area in the Southwest corner 
of the center, and asked Brown to release the property. 
Brown refused to do so. (T-43). This area was well 
over 300 feet from Brown's store. (Ex. 1). In 1961, 
Brown had reason to believe appellant might attempt 
building on the parking area, and through his counsel 
caused a letter (Ex. 5) to be written to appellant N ovem-
ber 10, 1961 (T-64). Further, he protested any such 
building to Mr. ·wade, manager of Appellant. (T-61). 
No construction was then attempted by Appellant. 
Thereafter, in late 1962 or early 1963 appellant 
through Wade met with Brown and his attorney, ex-
plaining appellant wanted to build in the parking area 
in the Northeast corner of the Center. (T-109, 46). 
Brown told Wade he would advise him as to whether 
Brown would consent to the building. (T-109). Brown 
then, upon being called by Wade, told him he would not 
consent. (T-47). Wade did not deny this conversation, 
(T-117) and agreed this refusal of Brown may have 
been the reason for putting up barricades. (T-117). 
Construction was started by appellant in the dis-
puted area, and then left for three or four months with-
out activity. (T-109). Thereafter, construction was re-
sumed and completed in the Winter of 1963. (T-31-71). 
Before, and during construction, Brown protested on 
three or four occasions to Wade. (DT-11, 13, T-47). 
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It is undisputed that Brown never in writing or orally 
agreed to the construction of this building upon his right 
of way. (T-116). 'l'his suit was commenced June 24, 1 
1964. (R-1). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
RESPONDENTS ARE NO'l1 BARRED BY THE DOC-
TRINE OF LACHES FROM SEEKING DAMAGES ' 
FOR DESTRUCTION OF THEIR EASEMENT BY 
APPELLANT. 
'11he relief sought by Brown in the lower court was 
(1) removal of the encroaching building, or (2) dam-
ages for the taking of the easement if the court did not 1 
require removal (R-3, 10). Clearly, the injunctive relief 
sought (removal of the building) was equitable and the 
1 
doctrine of !aches can be invoked to defeat an equitable 
claim. The trial court denied any injunctive or equi-
table relief (T-131, R-17), and no appeal was taken by 
Brown from such denial. The other matter, damage to 
property for taking a property right is not equitable but 
a law action, and laches has no application to such act-
tion. 30A C.J.S. Equity, Sec. 113, Page 28, 30, Fisher vs. 
Davis, 1930, 77 Utah 81, 291 Pac. 493. Brown however 
was not guilty of laches. He caused two letters to be 
ever, not guilty of laches. -He caused two letters to-be 
written to Appellant on the problem, (D'r-11) and pro-
tested the construction both prior to and during the 
construction. Beyond this, what could Brown do 1 He 
could file suit, seeking injunction, and post a large bond, 
with liability of a substantial amount resulting to him 
from the delayed construction if for any reason his suit 
failed. It is understandable Brown did not seek to do 
this for the year and a half from construction to the 
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filing of the instant suit. This time is far short of the 
applicable limitations perior. Brown took every action 
short of litigation that he could to protect his property 
rights in the parking area. 
Several additional facts militate against application 
of the doctrine. First, it is basic that laches cannot be 
invoked by one who comes into court with unclean 
hands. Another maxim here applicable is "He who 
seeks equity must do equity." The interesting facet 
of this case is the total absence of any claim by appel-
lant that Brown did not have a good, valid, easement 
in the lands. Now here is a claim made by appellant that 
the action it took was either in the belief it had a legal 
right to do so, or upon being induced to by Brown's 
actions, words or deeds. To the contrary, they proceeded 
with this in the face of actual and constructive knowledge 
of the easement (Ex. C, Ex. 5, T-115, T-109). ·wade, 
appellant's manager, admitted appellant received the 
letter (Ex. 5), and admitted Brown may have told him, 
just prior to construction, he would not consent to it. 
Tn fact, Wade testified as follows, (T-117). 
"Q. What I am asking, did he make it himself 
known to you after our meeting and prior to the 
construction of the building that he did not consent 
to any building on that area 1 
A. He could have. He could have. We have had 
more conversations and he could have. And 
that could have been one of the reasons we put 
the barricade up bec:rnt<e we were advised how 
to handle the situation. 
Q. Well you had some concern at that time about 
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Mr. Brown's position I suppose, didn't you T 
A. Yes. 
Q. In other words he hadn't consented had heY 
A. No. 
Q. Would it be fair to say that at one time you 
even had heated words with him regarding itt 
A. I don't think to my knowledge he and I ever 
had heated words. 
Q. During that period of time after the barri-
cade was put up you didn't have any further 
contact with him in this regard. You didn't go 
to see him or to seek his consent in other wordsf 
A. No. 
Q. You just put the barricades up and that was 
that? 
A. That is right. 
Q. But you did make it known to him, would 
this be correct, that you were going ahead and 
build this building with or without his consent? 
A. Yes." 
Again, Brown testified as follows: (T46-47). 
"Q. Did you subsequently have a further meet-
ing with Mr. Wade after the meeting that I at-
tendedT 
A. Yes. 
Q. And with regard to the building, was it then 
being constructed or had construction started on 
it? 
A. As I recall from the time the area was blocked 
off and all through points of, during construction 
of the building we discussed it in length, not in 
length but I told Mr. Wade upon numerous oc-
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casions that I was opposed to it. They were, in 
my opinion, in violation of my restrictive rights 
as granted me in my deed. 
Q. Specifically, can you recall a discussion im-
mediately, or the next time you saw Mr. Wade 
following the meeting that I was at T 
A. The discussion was not a personal meeting, 
Mr. Wade called me after our discussion with 
Mr. Campbell present and asked me what posit-
ion we were going to take. I told him that we 
were going to defend our rights in that shopping 
center, in that shopping area." 
This was, as the court found (T-130, R-17) a de-
liberate taking of Brown's property rights by appel-
lant with full knowledge of those rights. This is not 
the usual case when a party in good faith makes im-
provements in the belief, although mistaken, that he 
has the legal right to do so. One of the elements of the 
doctrine, as stated in 19 Am. Jur. Equity Sec. 498, is 
"lack of knowledge or notice on the part of defendant 
(appellant) that the complainant (Brown) would assert 
the right on which he bases his suit". To the same 
effect, 30 A.C .. J.S. Equity, Sec. 118, pages 66-67: 
"Not every change in conditions will constitute 
prejudice within the doctrine of laches. Thus, 
the defense of laches cannot be made available 
by a voluntary change of position with full know-
ledge of plaintiff's rights." 
"An element of laches is lack of know1edge on 
part of defendant that plaintiff will assert the 
right on which he bases his suit." (Note 18). 
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It should be remembered that the commencement 
of an action to determine Brown's rights in the area 
could have been initiated by appellant, as well as Brown. 
Very possibly this could have been disposed of in the 
three or four months that elapsed while appellant 
halted construction (T-109), but appellant saw fit not 
to do so. It should not now be permitted to complain 
because Brown did not file suit either. This principal 
is stated in 30A C.J.S. Equity, Sec. 114, Page 34, Note 
27, as follows: 
"Where either party to litigation could have 
commenced it, the doctrine of laches must be 
cautiously dealt with, and generally one of the 
parties will not be permitted to complain that 
the other has not taken appropriate action when 
he himself has taken none." 
Laches, as an equitable doctrine, is similar to es-
toppel. This court held, in Mary Jane Stevens Co. vs. 
First National Building Co., 1936, 89 U. 456, 57 P2d 
1099, at page 515, that 
"There can be no estoppel when both parties 
are equally ignorant or in equal knowledge that 
one is on the other's ground ... " 
Another maxim applied to equity cases is "Equity 
will not permit a wrongdoer to profit by his wrong," 
Jones Mining Co. vs. Cardiff, 1920, 56 U. 449, 
191 P. 426. In the present case, appellant has by it's 
wrongful act (1) deprived Brown of his right-of-way, 
and (2) removed an easement on 9280 square feet of 
appellant's property without cost to it. For the court 
to now foreclose Brown from asserting his rights would 
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clearly permit appellant to profit by it's wrongful act. 
The trial court found that to require removal of 
the building at this time would not be equitable, and 
refused to do so even though Brov,rn had an absolute 
right to have the property remain as it was. This 
procedure, of balancing the equities in considering in-
junctive relief, was approved by this court in Mary Jane 
Stevens Co. vs. First National Building Co., supra. The 
trial court further correctly held that the taking of this 
easement did damage Brown, and he was entitled to 
damages for such taking. 
POINT II 
'l'HE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
A JUDGMENT OF $3,000.00 IN FAVOR OF RE-
SPONDENrrs. 
Appellant has admitted, at pages 14-15 of its 
brief, 
(a) Respondents had a valid right of way in the 
area; 
( b) Appellant caused a building to be construe-
ted upon that right of way; 
( c) The i:1casure of damages for the taking of a 
right of way is the difference in value of the 
main property before and after the taking. 
The measure of damages set out by appellant's 
authorities is confirmed hy the Utah Supreme Court 
in A damson v. Brockbank et al, 112 U. 52, 185 P. 2d 
264, (1947). rrhis case quotes 28 C.J.S. Easements, See-
tion 114, as follows: 
"*** If the obstruction is permanent the measure 
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of damages is the difference in the market value 
of the owner's property with the passway open 
and with it closed, or as otherwise stated, the 
difference between the reasonable market value 
of the land immediately before it was known 
that the way would be obstructed and its market 
value immediately after it was destroyed .... ,, 
We respectfully submit that appellant argues mat-
ters that are not material to the above measure of 
damage. Further, that appellant has recited the evi-
dence most favorable to it's position, rather than the 
evidence favorable to the decision of the lower court. 
Lester Wade was allowed to testify that he made 
an appraisal of the property for loan purposes in 
1960 (T-119). This was three years before the taking. 
Again (T-120) he was allowed to testify that although 
he had not since appraised the lands, based on income 
of the property he had heard about, it was presently 
worth about $10,000.00 more than in 1960. This, 
of course, was a 1965 value, 2 years after the taking. 
This evidence is completely unrelated to the value 
before and after the destruction of the easement. Stated 
another way, the increase in value could have been still 
greater if the easement had not been taken. Wade is 
not qualified by the State of Utah as an appraiser 
(T-121). The tenant, Beck, testified his business had 
increased over the years, (T-100), that he was terminat-
ing the lease with Brown to seek a new location (T-101), 
but at no time did Beck attempt to value the Brown 
property, or to give an opinion as to whether the taking 
by appellant did enhance or detract from Brown's 
land. 
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Appellant complains there was no evidence offered 
of special damage, sueh as loss of rentals, loss of pat-
rons, etc. (App. Brief P. 15 ). Clearly, this type of 
evidence is inadmissihle when the encroachment is per-
manent, Adamson v. Brockbank,sitpra. 
Brown testified the encroachment would have a 
definite affect on his rental position because of the 
decreased parking arC'a (T-53). Further, the blocking 
of the rear drive entrance rendered this serviceway 
inaccessible to patrons of his store (T-49). He charac-
terized the affect as a 6 to 8 % decrease of future rentals 
'l'-53). Edmund Cook, a qualified appraiser, and a 
member of the American Institute of Real Estate Ap-
praisers (T-75-7G) testified that based upon examin-
ations of the physical buildings and surrounding area 
( T-89), rental history of Brown's store, ( T-85) and 
other pertinent factors, the value of Brown's land with 
the right of way was Ninety One Thousand One Hundred 
Twenty-Eight ( ~·91,128.00) Dollars, and without, or 
after the taking, Eighty-Three Thousand Eight Hun-
dred Fifty-Seven ($83,857.00) Dollars (T-82). This re-
sulted in a depreciation to the property of Seven Thous-
and 'rwo Hundred Seventy-One ($7,271.00) Dollars 
('l'-82). He further stated that parking for retail 
stores is effective only when within three hundred (300) 
feet of the store (T-95). 
The trial court found, correctly, that the new build-
ing had eliminated valuable close parking for Brown, 
and eliminated the customer entrance from the shopping 
c0nter to the thirty (30) foot right of way at the rear 
of Brown's building (R-17, Finding 11). The court 
further found that Respondent's property had lost value 
11 
of r:l'hree rrhousand ($3,000.00) Dollars by reason of this 
encroachment (R-17, Finding 14). The finding of the 
court trial is clearly within the evidence, and there is 
factually no contrary evidence to show the Respondents 
were not damaged to the extent of at least Three Thous-
and ($3,000.00) Dollars by this encroachment. 
CONCLUSION 
This court will not disturb the findings of the 
trial court unless they are clearly against the weight of 
the evidence. Heiselt vs. Heiselt, 10 U. 2d 126, 349 
P. 2d 175 (1960). We believe the evidence so clearly 
preponderates in favor of Respondents that a finding 
in favor of appellant would have been reversible. 
It is uncontroverted that Respondents had a valu-
able parking easement in 9300 square feet of property 
adjacent to their building, and that appellant destroyed 
this easement without a vestige of legal justification 
or even good faith. Respondents did all they could, 
short of injunction, to stop the building, and suit was 
filed within a matter of months afterward. Appellant 
has no right to invoke the powers of equity to def eat 
respondents' claim, as this was a deliberate invasion 
that appellant profited by. The trial court discounted 
the damage figure testified to by Cook on the basis that 
this was a growing, new center that had not reached its 
full customer potential. (T-131). The evidence clearly 
supports the findings and judgment of the Trial Court. 
We submit this court should affirm the trial court's 
judgment. Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD W. CAMPBELL, 
Attorney for Respondents 
2324 Adams Avenue, Ogden, Utah 
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